Thursday, October 22, 2015

Posing a Threat

The closest anyone has ever come to dismantling Kim’s cult of personality occurred in Jul-Aug of 1956. The event took place during the period of de-Stalinization in the USSR. At the time, North Korea had increasingly limited oversight from Russia; the interest Stalin had placed in the DPRK had diminished, along with its influence as well. This created a unique opportunity for the elite ruling class of Korea. They no longer needed to be wary of being purged – as Stalin had done to those who contradicted him before – and they had the freedom to strategize – due to Kim’s absence.

Kim had planned a two month trip to a number of communist countries, including a double booking to Moscow.  He was absent beginning in the 1st of June and ending around the 19th of July. As one of my authors points out, “the physical absence of a dictator from his country always provides favorable conditions for discontent” (Lankov 156). Kim, a dictator himself, witnessed the growing opposition with his return. During the time he had been gone, a growing force of Yanan (Chinese interest) faction members, within the KWP (Korean Workers Party), had assembled a number of complaints against Kim’s leadership style. The complaints were first presented to Moscow (in order to pacify the possible shock) and were to be showcased at a plenum shortly following Kim’s arrival, in which the leaders hoped to achieve one of two things: either a public acknowledgement of self-criticism or the weakening of Kim’s presence as a member of the KWP.

However, due to Kim’s vigilance when absent and his vast connections within inner party circles, he was able to sway the general opinion, a few members at a time. Therefore, when it came time for the plenum, Kim had already assembled a number of defendants on his part, subsequently thwarting the efforts of the Korean elite. Despite the failures of the party members to shift public opinion, the language used to canvass their situation has survived through Soviet archives. Some examples are shown below:

Yi P’il-gyu: “Kim Il Sung’s personality cult has become intolerable. He will not brook any criticism or self-criticism. His word is law. He has gathered sycophants and lackeys… around him in the Central committee” (Lankov 159).
            Ch’oe Ch’ang-ok: “I am becoming more and more convinced that Kim Il Sung does not understand how harmful his behavior is. He intimidates everyone. Nobody can voice an opinion on any question…. Sung’s personality cult has infiltrated our party… it has spread… democratic legality is distorted and the Leninist principle of collective leadership is not adhered to” (Lankov 160-161).

The dialogue is highly suggestive of dictatorship. Kim has run away with power, disregarding the opinions of his allies in the process. The inter-party struggle lacks the authority to control the growing threat posed by Kim. Only the Soviet Union could combat his influence at this point, but their attention is turned far away and towards other matters.


Lanʹkov, A. N. From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945-1960. New              Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 2002.

3 comments:

  1. This is very interesting to me because a large focus of my research has been on the challenges made by the Parisian Parliament against the Royal Government when Louis XIV was still a small child. It seems that you're right, when a dictator (Or monarch, but they're one in the same according to Thomas Paine), is not able to directly intimidate people (as in an absence or simply by being a small boy) trouble does brew!

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  2. I find it interesting that when the people dissented, they reported to the USSR; kinda knocks against the idea that Kim is an independent ruler of an independent country.

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  3. Interesting point, Tyler. How does Lan'kov get his sources/interviews?

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