Termites in the Wood: Flaws Within the Pro-Boycott Ideology

            Fundamentally, the reasoning behind the 1980 Olympic boycott had two main flaws. These problems rotted away at the foundation of the pro-boycott movement until it lost steam and eventually stalled in late March. First, both the Carter administration and Congress were more than willing to rewrite the history of the 1936 Olympics. Second, the American policy makers assumed that attendance of the games equaled acceptance of the policy. Ultimately Carter forced the issue so much that the boycott continued, but without a meaningful reason the support slowly withered away.

            In 1936 the Olympic games were held in Berlin where under the watchful eye of Adolf Hitler, an African-American by the name of Jesse Owens won 4 gold medals. As Colonel Miller, the executive director of the United States Olympic Committee said before a congressional hearing: “…one black American athlete by the name of Jesse Owens did more to debunk the Nazi thesis of a superpower than any other individual” (Congress, 20). How did the members of Congress respond? Representative Jack F. Kemp of New York said “The world shut their eyes and ears to what was happening in fascist Mussolini’s regime as well as Nazi Germany… The decision not to boycott the 1936 games was made within 2 months after the Nazis published the Nuremberg laws… and we said never again” (Congress, 57).  Ultimately the American government was to willing to forget the fact that when faced with a rising fascist threat American athletes did the best they could to disprove the theory of racial superiority, by defeating German athletes on their own turf. Moscow was a chance to do the same, the Olympic games was a chance to face the Soviet lifestyle head to head.

            Next, the administration also thought their attendance would equal acceptance. As Kemp went on to say “I am not suggesting that the Olympic games ratified the actions of Mussolini and Hitler, but it certainly did lend an air of legitimacy to that movement” (Congress, 53). The Americans assumed that their attendance in Berlin had said to the world: America accepts Nazi Germany. The most average observer of foreign affairs would have a hard time believing that a mere sporting event could have befriended the worst of enemies. The same would have been evident during the Cold War of Moscow and Washington.