Presidential Confrontation and Olympic Spirit: Examination of the relationship between Lord Killanin and Jimmy Carter

Recently, I found several of what will probably be my most prolific primary sources. From what I have found so far, it seems there was an interesting power play between Jimmy Carter and the president of the International Olympic Committee Michael Morris the Third Baron of Killanin. What gives this conflict weight is the interplay between the U.S. domestically and other National or Federal Olympic Committees. In this situation, Jimmy Carter held all the cards. That is to say, there was no realistic option of Lord Killanin other than to object to the American-led boycott. How then did this proxy battle between the two end up reaching far into the Carter administration? Between Carter’s presidential memoirs and diary, and a book of speeches from Lord Killanin I expect to find the answer.

Killanin has a powerful vantage point. He served as president of the IOC from 1972 to 1980. Those eight years had no shortage of political events in the Olympics. In the Munich Olympics of 1972, several Israeli Olympians were held hostage and ultimately murdered by members of Black September. In the 1976 Olympics, two separate boycotts occurred. The Republic of China refused to participate since they would be forced to change their Chinese Taipei due to pressure from the People’s Republic of China. Then the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa organized a boycott, partially led by Arthur Ashe, since the IOC had refused to remove New Zealand from the games. This was after New Zealand played several rugby league games with Apartheid South Africa who was under an Olympic suspension for their racially led teams. All this led Killanin to say in 1977: “Sports and politics unfortunately are frequently interrelated. Our Objective is to bring everyone together regardless of race, creed, or political belief.” This was all before the massive 66-nation boycott of the Olympics in Moscow. Was Killanin's vehement opposition to the boycott in 1980 an attempt to save face over what may be the worst 8 years in Olympic history, or was it more of a moral objection to try and save the purity of the Olympic movement?

Carter on the other hand, probably took the “soft power” warranted by the Olympics for granted. In international politics, soft power is any form of propaganda for co-operation, rather than the use of money or force to coerce co-operation. After the success of the “Miracle on Ice” hockey team in the 1980 winter games and all the national attention it garnished, Carter may have thought that the pressure put on the U.S.S.R. from an Olympic boycott would be enough to force them to leave Afghanistan. Obviously, whatever Carter thought, the boycott was an ineffective strategy since the Soviets did not withdrawal until 1989. What was Carter really thinking he could gain from the boycott? And how did he plan to sidestep Lord Killanin?

In conclusion, the diaries and memoirs of both serve as an interesting inside look into the proxy battle at the top of the Olympic boycott. They will provide insight into the top two decision makers of the entire process, and hopefully open the door for new historical conclusions.

Sarantakes, Nicolas Evan. Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott and the Cold War: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

US Department Of State. Meeting At The Kremlin. May 12, 1980. https://foia.state.gov/Search/results.aspx?searchText=*&caseNumber=F-2011-00809