To Cabinet Members

To Cabinet Members

Executive Mansion,
Sir: Washington, May 3, 1864.

It is now quite certain that a large number of our colored soldiers, with their white officers, were, by the rebel force, massacred after they had surrendered, at the recent capture of Fort-Pillow. So much is known, though the evidence is not yet quite ready to be laid before me. Meanwhile I will thank you to prepare, and give me in writing your opinion as to what course, the government should take in the case. Yours truly A. LINCOLN

This memo was sent by Abraham Lincoln to his Cabinet 2 days prior to Senator Wade producing his report on the Battle of Fort Pillow. The memo shows that Fort Pillow had become a serious enough issue in the current time to issue a special discussion of the President's Cabinet. Lost in the subtleness of the message is that at the time there were 3 types of policy alternatives mentioned after Fort Pillow, retribution or retaliation, arresting Forrest, and agreeing to Congressional proposals regarding the reconstruction of the South. Lincoln had stated in his State of the Union address in 1863 that he would not favor any definite and harmful policies on reconstruction and Lincoln was not in the business of blaming individuals for events during the Civil War, so those two policy alternatives were not the main purpose of the memo. When Lincoln asks for opinion on what course of action the government should take, he is likely only asking about the policy of retribution. The Cabinets responses were split, although most were in favor of arresting Forrest. This left Lincoln with a tough decision, to retaliation in some way for the massacre or to continue the status quo despite such atrocities. 

To Edwin M. Stanton 

Hon. Secretary of War: Executive Mansion
Sir. Washington, D. C. May 17. 1864

Please notify the insurgents, through the proper military channels and forms, that the government of the United States has satisfactory proof of the massacre, by insurgent forces, at Fort-Pillow, on the 12th. and 13th. days of April last, of fully white and colored officers and soldiers of the United States, after the latter had ceased resistance, and asked quarter of the former.

That with reference to said massacre. the government of the United States has assigned and set apart by name insurgent officers, theretofore, and up to that time, held by said government as prisoners of war.

That, as blood can not restore blood, and government should not act for revenge, any assurance, as nearly perfect as the case admits, given on or before the first day of July next, that there shall be no similar massacre, nor any officer or soldier of the United States, whether white or colored, now held, or hereafter captured by the insurgents, shall be treated other than according to the laws of war, will insure the replacing of said insurgent officers in the simple condition of prisoners of war.

That the insurgents having refused to exchange, or to give any account or explanation in regard to colored soldiers of the United States captured by them, a number of insurgent prisoners equal to the number of such colored soldiers supposed to have been captured by said insurgents will, from time to time, be assigned and set aside, with reference to such captured colored soldiers, and will, if the insurgents assent, be exchanged for such colored soldiers; but that if no satisfactory attention shall be given to this notice, by said insurgents, on or before the first day of July next, it will be assumed by the government of the United States, that said captured colored troops shall have been murdered, or subjected to Slavery, and that said government will, upon said assumption, take such action as may then appear expedient and just.

Two weeks later after discussion with his Cabinet, Lincoln writes these instructions to the Secretary of War. Interestingly, Lincoln never signed or sent the instructions. Even the instructions are a mild form of retaliation since they only ask that the South gives assurance for no more massacres of soldiers should occur and the prisoners of war will then be returned. If they made that assurance then the US would trade these soldiers for black prisoners of war. If there were not enough black prisoners of war, then the US government would "take such action as may then appear expedient and just" which does not automatically mean murder. Many radical Republicans at the time favored the murder of Southern POWs and to stop the prisoner exchanges that the two sides had been practicing throughout the war. However, Lincoln's never radicalized to that extent. 

The report by Wade was the sufficient evidence Lincoln needed to engage in political action in response to Fort Pillow. However, opinions and rhetoric had gone too far towards vengeance after Fort Pillow, and Lincoln would not support any vengeful policy. Wade and radical Republicans had the opportunity to sway Lincoln towards more radical policies, however, the tone of vengeance and blame turned Lincoln away from meaningful political action after Fort Pillow.